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'slork, Supreme Court, Utah 
Supreme Court 
State of Utah 
Attention: Geoffrey J. Butler 
Clerk of Court 
322 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Re: Patricia Christiansen v. Holiday Rent-A-Car dba 
Flexi-Lease, Inc. et al. Case No. 19700 
Dear Mr. Butler: 
Pursuant to Rule 24(J) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, appellants in the above-referred matter hereby 
submit citations of supplemental authorities. These 
authorities became available, or to the attention of counsel, 
after the filing of briefs in this matter. 
POINT I. 
Judicial Estoppel. Page 29 of appellants Brief. 
Condas v. Condas, 618 P.2d 491 (Utah, 1980). Statements by a 
party constitute "admissions against interest11 even against 
parties successor in subsequent litigation on the same issue. 
Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Caves, 481 So.2d 764 (Miss. 1985). 
Acts and knowledge of agent included imputed to insurer even 
when agent does not fully advise insurer. 
Trovillion v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty, 474 N.E.2d 953 
(111. 1985). When case presents genuine issues as to coverage, 
insurer estopped from later denying coverage unless it first 
either exercises option of defending with reservation of rights 
or seeking declaratory judgment on coverage. 
POINT II. 
Summary Judgment Law. Page 30 of appellants1 Brief. 
Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah, 1985). 
Opposing motions for summary judgment with only one supported 
by admissible evidence. ,fIn the absence of any responsive 
affidavits, we take the assertions of (opposing) affidavits as 
true." 
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Celotex Corp, v. Catrett, 54 U.S. Law Week 4775, 477 U.S. , 
91 L.Ed.2d 265, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (1986). Summary judgment no 
longer disfavored in law when it helps to secure the "speedy, 
just and inexpensive determination" of a case. Summary 
judgment mandatory if party fails to make an adequate factual 
showing on an essential point. 
Anderson v. Libert Lobby Inc., 54 U.S. Law Week 4755, 477 
U.S. , 106 S.Ct. 2505. Companion case to Celotex. To 
withstand documented summary judgment motion, rebuttal must be 
substantial and factual. 
Lind v. Lynch, 665 P.2d 1276 (Utah, 1983). On summary judgment 
motion, even negative position must be supported by evidence. 
In Lind, negative was lack of malice. Here, negative is lack 
of insurance. 
POINT III. 
Lima v. Chambers, 657 P.2d 279 (Utah, 1982). As insurer may be 
bound by default judgment if it has knowledge of proceedings, 
it can intervene to protect its interests. 
Jefferson Pilot Fire & Casualty Co. v. Prichett, 345 S.E.2d 629 
(Ga. 1986). While insurer may initially refuse to insure or 
defend, it may continue to do so only as long as facts or law 
make the defense viable, and is independently liable if it 
persists in non-coverage thereafter. 
Sincerely, 
SAMUEL KING •' ' 
SK/has 
cc: Robert L. Stevens 
